Although there is a growing body of research exploring the transition to a more service-based orientation in 1999; Gilley and Rasheed, 2000; Williamson, 1985; Grover and Malhotra, 2003) and, the other on public procurement (e.g. Thai and Piga, 2006; Knight et al., 2007) and Public-Private Partnerships in particular (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005; Froud, 2003). Three distinct governance challenges are presented: (1) contractual, (2) relational and (3) integration. The paper explores the implications of the conceptual model by developing a range of research propositions that are intended to be the foundations for future research.
Introduction
Buying the performance outcomes of a resource-in-use, rather than acquiring the resource and using it, is not a novel phenomenon: from the laundry where a customer purchases 'cleaned clothes' to the vehicle-leasing firm where a client contracts for 'miles travelled'. Today however, this approach is being increasingly applied to the procurement of complex performance: DuPont for instance, after years of outsourcing non-core services, awarded a long-term contract to Convergys to redesign and deliver the various HRM programs for its 60,000 employees in 70 countries (Engardio et al., 2006) . 
The Content and Context of PCP
Consider the provision of aero-engine 'power by the hour'. Although interand intra-organisational boundaries have clearly been changed, the intrinsic complexities of aero-engine supply and support have not been removed by this procurement arrangement: these sophisticated capital assets still need to be paid for (depreciated) and supported, often globally, by a
Maintenance-Repair-Overhaul (MRO) organisation, with the support of a range of external contractors.
Moreover, although an apparently simple procurement arrangement, with airlines specifying This archetype provides a useful point of departure for this conversation but in order to build a conceptually robust picture of PCP it is necessary to bound the distinct phenomenon before moving on to explore why and how organisations embark on the PCP process.
What is PCP?
Noting that any complexity construct is relative, Unsurprisingly, this has often meant that they are a controversial area of public and private expenditure.
Second, there is the complexity of the infrastructure through which performance is enacted. This complexity can be largely characterized by the extent to which it is "bespoke or highly customized" (Brady et al., 2005).
Infrastructure procurement is often irregular and, as a result, buyers often rely heavily on specialist suppliers, indeed increasingly firms "know less than they buy" especially in the light of recent outsourcing trends (Davies, 2003) . Although further work will be needed to operationalize the two framing dimensions (and thereby generate empirical tests for the typology and its boundaries) in this preliminary work it is possible to further detail the other categories in order to reinforce the differential characteristics of Category IV. 1 An asset is transaction specific if its value in a transaction with another party is reduced and correspondingly, the larger the value 'gap' between its best and best-alternative use, the greater the specificity of the asset. 2 Although governance through hierarchy necessitates high fixed setup costs, its use of authority rather than court enforced contract law (for market governance) provides greater control over specific capability investments (Masten, 1988 The greater the complexity of the performance solution being procured, rather than developed in-house, the more significant the risk that supplier-led innovation outside that specified in the contract will diminish over the lifetime of the contract.
Empirical Research
This is not an empirical paper. The concepts and specific propositions presented are however intended to 
